Michael Young’s piece here attempts to quickly debunk what has thankfully become a more common line of criticism, even in the US – that the Bush Administration’s painfully evident desire for, and multiple actions towards, regime changes in the Middle East was at the center of its moral and political failure.
This makes sense of course, as Young was an intellectual cheerleader for key aspects of the Bush project, for Amb. Jeffrey Feltman as his seminal figure in Lebanon (as per his book) as well as the overall Neo-LiberalCon approach to questions of freedom, justice and reason in the region.
His attempt to overturn the meaning of the regime change approach vis-a-vis Syria is about as convincing as his defense of the Iraq War now seems though – i.e not very convincing at all on several grounds. What is most interesting is the underlying idea guiding his argument here: mainly, that the Bush administration NEVER REALLY TRIED the hard stick approach.
This is fascinating because it is a now common theme from the right, that EVEN Bush never really went that hard on the “bad guys.” In other words, if only this approach could be tried NOW – since the US policy failure was NOT related to a hard stick policy 2000-2008 – well, then we might restore Freedom and Reason to the Middle East.
The problem is that the hard stick policy – and yes Regime Change policies – were CERTAINLY debated and CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, and were implemented in several instances – and when it came to Syria. The central problem was NOT that the Bush folks did not WANT regime change – they, and especially Mr. Eliott Abrams who constantly writes and wrote about his desires – evidently did – the problem was that between 2005 and 2008 the balance of power began to shift such that the Bush folks could not seriously or reasonably or fully push the ideological goals which numerous Bush officials publicly set forth (one of which was to defeat Evil and NOT TO TALK TO EVIL like assad etc).
Young, however, argues:
“…it is equally true, with the benefit of hindsight, that the Bush administration never sought regime change in Damascus. Some in Beirut did, but Washington never seriously pursued such a foolhardy project, nor did it indicate the contrary.
— Young’s nemesis Josh Landis has one great cite
here, and this is just from the public memoirs sections of the evidence we now have –
Tony Blair who explained, as the report titles it:
Ignoring this, and ignoring the July 2006 War which was one, failed attempt at regime change in Lebanon (Smashing Hizbullah) as a useful means of accelerating Assad’s decline and/or his capitulation to US interests (the latter of which is indeed REGIME CHANGE…the actor at the head just stays, as in Libya, but his bad regime is now GOOD and TAME), Young continues:
“…Not only was there no appetite in Washington to expand the war to Syria, there was no intention from the military in Baghdad to permit such a slide. In fact even when it came to controlling the open Iraqi-Syrian border, through which suicide bombers were passing, the Americans were surprisingly unobtrusive. Aside from a few high-profile operations, the military didn’t have the manpower to exert sustained local pressure on Syria, let alone conceive of something more ambitious [How is Young so certain of this to make such an incredibly sweeping statement?]
–Well a great CS monitor report and the Boston Globe original on this from
2005 – again BUT ONE OF countless documents in this regard that Young only needs to Google as [REGIME CHANGE SYRIA BUSH ADMINISTRATION]! – makes it clear that the Bush administration was indeed planning for and debating REGIME CHANGE… at the very least from the public sphere even if there were of course those opposed in the intel community, military and even Bush’s own WH on the wisdom of this course.
Moreover, a key idea was that even if actual military force to overthrow Assad was not put into place (and the biggest question is why – i.e. strategic balance which had shifted), and even if there were concerns about the aftermath (of course), the strategy from the Bush folks and the ideological desire was CERTAINLY, OVERWHELMINGLY one of constant pressure and force to bear on Damascus as the near-EXCLUSIVE means of “changing regime behavior” (of course the approach of pressuring Israel on Golan etc was thrown under the car as yet one more consequence of the overall ideology here).
FROM 2005 – “While publicly Bush administration officials say they just want to see a “change in behavior” from Syria, The Boston Globe reported Tuesday that some of these officials are saying privately that there is an active debate about whether “regime change” (the use of military force to remove the current Syrian administration) should be a US goal. The discussions come as the US has decided to cut off nearly all contact with the Syria, in an effort to “weaken and isolate” President Bashir Assad’s government.
“William Arkin, who writes about national and homeland security for The Washington Post, wrote that even before last Monday’s vote at the United Nations, where the UN Security Council demanded that Syria support “fully and unconditionally” the investigation into the February assassination of Lebanese politician Rafik Hariri, the US had upgraded its plans for possible military action against Syria. Mr. Arkin writes that internal intelligence documents and conversations with military officers involved in the planning show that US Central Command was directed last year to prepare a “strategic concept” for Syria, “the first step in creation of a full fledged war plan. ”
And this is but one public report from 2005!
Young continues:
“…Proponents of the regime-change theory might respond that even if the Bush administration was not plotting to overthrow Assad through force, it was looking to set up the conditions for a domestic upheaval, perhaps a coup. Possibly. The US would not have saved the Assad regime had it fallen from the weight of its own ills. But that doesn’t qualify as regime change.”
— Well then Young has eviscerated the import of the term, so yes he is right – But remember, Young made a much more sweeping claim earlier! DC never “sought” never “intended” and had “no appetite” for regime change….which is just not true, even though one can debate the semantics of what regime change really means in practical effect.
Finally, on the Tribunal, Young attempts to rebut the growing realization that the Bush folks viewed and encouraged the STL as a sword against Damascus by saying: “It is odd that those who believe the US hoped to bring about regime change in Damascus through the investigative process would, for example, point to the Brammertz-Feltman meeting to bolster their argument.”
— Well leave aside for a moment whether Young is right on the narrow point… as Young knows full well, Exhibit A is…… Mehlis. And there, well, those who understand the obtuse Bush emphasis on bringing force and pressure ONLY to bear on Damascus can have a field day… even with Google as your only tool!
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