What Hizbullah learned from the Gaza War II
Of course, there is some exaggeration here in this analysis from abna news agency… and there is, as always, some measure of over confidence in regards to the understanding of the enemy…. but I think this analysis might not be so far from the truth and either way, reflects in general, Hizbullah’s strategic understanding of the Gaza War II.
“…That is, the “latest version” of the Palestinian-“Israeli” confrontation allowed Hizbullah to discover the effective level the enemy’s capacities have reached after the war in 2006 on Lebanon and in 2008 on Gaza, noting the subsequent revisions, maneuvers, and investigation committees which all aimed at bridging the gaps among the “Israeli” army and on the internal front during the war.
Albeit deriving lessons from Gaza war might need quite a time, the Resistance in Lebanon has thus far concluded the following:
-The “Israeli” Army Intelligence is shortsighted, which made it fail to realize the ballistic missile force the Palestinian resistance owns. This was clear when the enemy was taken aback after shelling Tel Aviv and al-Quds. If this was the state of the “Israeli” Intelligence with respect to the nearby and small Gaza, how would it be with respect to the surprises of the Resistance in Lebanon?
-It has been proven once again that the “Israeli” air force is unable to vanquish any battle and that the troops indeed fear any ground confrontation and even seek to skirt it.
-The “Israeli” internal scene is still fragile and ailing, despite all the endeavors to increase its immunity in the past years, through maneuvers and trainings which settlers have undertaken. But the sirens that went on throughout al-Quds and Tel Aviv were enough to spark panic among the “Israelis,” even before the explosion of missiles which, in the first place, hit the confidence of settlers in their leaders.
-It seemed that just a few missiles which hit the main cities in “Israel” were sufficient to shake the balance of the “Israeli” command and to push it to rush for pacification. This highlighted too many weak points in the enemy’s capability of keeping control.
-It turned out that the exorbitant Iron Dome cannot effectively protect the “Israeli” depth. It rather seemed like a “pierced sieve” before tens and hundreds of missiles. How it would seem then before thousands of missiles coming from Lebanon? The Resistance in Lebanon still hasn’t played and uncovered all its cards; yet this didn’t prevent Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah from confirming, during Ashoura’s speech, that thousands of rockets shall bog down occupied Palestine in any next war, and that the span of the confrontation shall extend throughout Palestine. This is a message that mirrors the substantial and strategic development of Hizbullah’s capacities since 2006.
Those who are well versed about these capacities confirm that the “Israeli” enemy will be surprised by the fiery force of the Resistance. It will be mostly surprised by the accuracy of its missiles in far-reaching definite targets.
They also note that if “Israel” was exhausted after 33 days, only few days would wear it out in any next confrontation. It will discover that July War was just a stroll compared to what is next.
Sources close to Hizbullah believe that the option of a war on Lebanon and Iran shrunk after Gaza’s experience, saying that “Israel,” which may have assumed in the past that Hizbullah was boasting of its capacities as part of the psychological war, is now more convinced about the party’s deterrence force. It even has a thousand apprehensions about this force, considering that if the besieged Palestinian factions own quality missiles, it is certain that Hizbullah, as it moves in a wider space, can go way further in armament.
However, the sources maintain that albeit the “mandatory realism” which would stamp “Israel’s” considerations in the upcoming stage, there shall be no utter relief, because the enemy will certainly seek to compensate the ground restrictions shackling it by fueling strife in order to preoccupy the Resistance. The enemy would seek to achieve through internal conflicts what it failed to score in direct confrontation. It might even resort to assassinations to reach its goals. This of course entails awareness and vigilance among the Lebanese in order that the enemy’s schemes should be foiled.”