The Mideastwire Blog

Excerpts from the Arab and Iranian Media & Analysis of US Policy in the Region

Post Election stage in Syria looks set for far greater violence—lessons un-learned

I came to Washington via Europe, hoping that there would be some analysis supporting my own hope that a 2nd term Obama would have the courage to take the morally and strategically better track of finally beginning political negotiations without the pre condition that Assad goes, lubricated by a ceasefire, perhaps de facto temporary borders (a temporary partition along the current battle lines) and an endpoint that would probably see key parts of the assad regime remaining, battered though, even though Assad himself may eventually “leave.”

This would be essentially accommodating the Iranian-Russian-Hizbullah-China position in the short term, but recognizing that in the medium and long term a) stabilizing the descent into further chaos and avoiding the immense forthcoming violence/blowback NOW and b) using the US’s vastly preponderant position to steadily, obliquely erode even further the Assad regime’s position and that of its allies (together with our allies in the region directly on the ground in a relatively stable, but divided Syria) would all be best from the position of US strategic AND moral interests (on this point specifically, by avoiding the massive casualties that are to come in an accelerated war).

Sadly – almost everyone seems to believe that obama or Romney are going to arm of the rebels and accelerate the velocity and the shape of the violence.

This will be a huge disaster with multiple unintended consequences that are going to be next to impossible to control – indeed, here, professor Landis should realize that going down the slope of more and better weapons HAS COUNTER REACTIONS which fuels a very quick and vicious cycle… 100 stinger missiles will NOT magically reach some kind of tipping point here, since it will only fuel more reaction and violence and deeper involvement on the other side, as well as the activation of an even wider array of contingencies, plots and little attempts at “game changers.”

Ironically, if all the experts are right, we are perched on the edge of being taught yet again exactly the same lessons (un)learned from the 1980s-1990s Afghan experience and Iraq war.

Our deafness and lack of courage in this regard – obtuseness really – after we have seen this movie so many times before is only made worse by another fact: the Resistance Axis is weaker than it has ever been…. If we were patient and somewhat accommodating in our negotiations, we might have a good chance to stabilize the situation and activate its many new found weakness, fatally undermining it’s ability and desire to exercise violence over time. By increasing the violence on our side, we will only breathe more life into the axis and fuel an even greater military counter-reaction.

Some in Washington think hizbullah, for one, has ALREADY gone “all in.” As Nasrallah warned a few weeks ago in regards to the threats by some syrian rebels to bomb shiite areas, we have not seen much at all yet. Hizbullah of the july 2006  – where Israel was essentially beat to a standstill and retreat – is much much more militarily powerful 6 YEARS LATER. how does this all add up then in the “day after.” And what are we working with on that day after? What will be left?


Written by nickbiddlenoe

November 2, 2012 at 9:53 pm

Posted in Uncategorized

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