The Mideastwire Blog

Excerpts from the Arab and Iranian Media & Analysis of US Policy in the Region

Ibrahim Amin on Hizbullah’s confusion

Of course, this was always the point so many were making in the critical 2004-2006 period: get Hizbullah more into the political process and it will normalize them (not necessarily in a positive way!), give them more of a stake and the desire and ability to exercise violence will diminish. That chance was thrown out of course by Team Bush-M14 who chose the path of pressure and force culminating in the july 2006 war and may 2008. From Akhbar:

“Nor do we know how the party’s decisions were made. How come it supported the reform proposals put forward by General Michel Aoun’s parliamentary bloc, and then didn’t seek discussion of the first item of those proposals, namely the issue of wages and social benefits? What argument did Mikati use to persuade the party’s representatives? Was it all settled in a matter of minutes, i.e. between the time Nahhas finished presenting his plan and the time Mikati began presenting his own?

Was the plan discussed in all the party’s relevant leadership bodies – its trade unions unit, social organizations concerned with people’s wellbeing , parliamentary group, political communications section, ministers, and political advisory team – and they came to a conclusion which the two ministers expressed at the cabinet session; only for it to turn out to be a mistake, or a public, political, and even moral liability?

The obvious conclusion to draw from the failure of any Hezbollah official to explain what happened at the time is that the party – Lebanon’s most powerful, active and influential – suffered a bout of confusion. Confusion over domestic political strategy, in utter contrast to the coherence, clarity, directness, precision, realism, principle, and determination which characterize the party’s policy towards the Syrian crisis, or its handling of the resistance’s security, military and logistical affairs.

Can this become a bygone? Are supporters of the resistance, of the party’s alliance with the Free Patriotic Movement, and of the reform proposals, supposed to just accept what happened – without second thought, question or argument? Without telling the party that this was a mistake, a grave mistake, whether it was a considered move or a blunder? That, at least, is how it is seen on the other side of the political and popular alliance of which Hezbollah is a mainstay.

It is a mistake that enables the party’s enemies – not the usual pathetic bunch, but the devious ones who are inside rather than outside the tent – to engage in incitement against the entire alliance that has existed between Hezbollah and the FPM for the past six years. It is a mistake that allows schemers – not the openly hostile ones, but those who hide behind a reformist or sectional facade – to spew their deadly venom within the angry Aounist camp. Hezbollah may have the capacity to prevent a backlash within its own ranks, but that doesn’t necessarily apply to its supporters or to adherents who are non-members. Both stand to be united in outrage…”

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Written by nickbiddlenoe

December 15, 2011 at 12:35 am

Posted in Uncategorized

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