Wiki-Wonder: “Is the Strategic Balance Changing?”
From an October 2009 cable. Given the steady trajectory likely since that time, one can only conclude that there is a firm answer now:
1) Yes – the strategic balance – the QME specifically – has changed and is continuing to change NOT in the US or Israel’s favor;
2) Hizbullah is at the forefront of the shift;
3) In the absence of a credible peace process, Syria’s likely active support for this strategy makes a great deal of since – though dangerous of course.
Is there a way to shift this logic? Of course. Will the Obama folks go down those paths open to them – sadly, no. And certainly not in time it seems.
FROM THE CABLE:
“…Is the Strategic Balance Changing?
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¶2. (S/NF) Syria’s determined efforts to re-arm Hizballah during and after the July-August 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah have consistently grabbed Israeli headlines, most recently with Israeli Chief of Staff Ashkenazi’s November 10 revelation that Hizballah possessed 320-kilometer range rockets. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported October 28 on Hizballah’s deployment of the first guided surface-to-surface M600 missile on Lebanese soil, with a range of 250 kilometers and circular error probability of 500 meters. Public estimates put Hizballah’s stockpile as high as 40,000 rockets and missiles, reinforcing assessments by some experts that this build-up may portend a shift in the military balance between Israel and its northern nemesis. Hizballah SecGen Nasrallah’s recent claims of possessing a capability to “destroy” the IDF may overstate the case for domestic and regional propaganda purposes, but reporting in other channels confirms Nasrallah’s bragging on November 11 that Hizballah can sustain fire on Tel Aviv and reach “all of Israel.” This capability, if fully used, would represent a quantum leap over the damage and psychological terror Hizballah rockets caused in northern Israel during the 2006 war.
¶3. (S/NF) There is overwhelming evidence that shows Syria provided not just logistical and other support in moving the weapons, but was the main source of the weapons. Syria’s integration of Hizballah into its military doctrine, moreover, means that Hizballah operatives and facilities enjoy a growing footprint in Syria.
¶4. (S/NF) At least two potential consequences flow from Hizballah’s increased capabilities and Syria’s role in creating them: (1) If there is another war between Hizballah and Israel, it will be far deadlier than the 2006 conflict; (2) as in 2006, there would be compelling reasons for Israel to want to keep Syria out of any future war if possible, but there might be a countervailing need to hit Hizballah and perhaps targets in Syria, some of which are located in populated areas.
“…Asad nonetheless appears more convinced than ever that arming Hizballah is necessary for Syrian security and perhaps as a stick to bring the current Israeli government back to negotiations on the return of the Golan. Syrians remain resistant to the notion that Syria bears responsibility for managing a potentially explosive situation that could draw Damascus into a war neither sought nor winnable.
[Not winnable? hmmm, have you guys been paying attention to the ways by which the Resistance Axis views the next war as indeed winnable - though certainly horrible? They may be WRONG - but there is indeed a theory, a framework, for success.... PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT THE ACTORS THEMSELVES ARE SAYING guys.]
“….¶11. (S/NF) While the near-term chances for a successful dialogue on Syria’s strategic relationship with Hizballah are much lower, the stakes — the possibility of a regional conflict and significant obstacles to achieving comprehensive peace — are just as, if not more, urgent. Sharing our concerns about the dangers of Syria’s arming of Hizballah, probably best done privately in a one-on-one session with President Asad, could serve to establish the basis of a more frank exchange about Syria’s role, and enable us to challenge potentially dangerous Syrian assumptions as part of a wider strategic dialogue. Recent revelations about Syria’s role in weapons shipments create some urgency in turning Syrian attention toward ending these supplies and restraining Hizballah from making good on its provocative rhetoric.
“¶12. (S/NF) We don’t expect these points immediately to change Syrian behavior or its relations with Hizballah, but we believe sounding this warning would put President Asad and others (such as Turkey and France) on notice that Syria’s actions have created a situation in which miscalculation or provocative behavior by Hizballah could prove disastrous for Syria and the broader region. This message could likewise underscore our belief that Syria needs to demonstrate a more active role in achieving peace with Israel and better relations with the United States. Even if a war between Israel and Hizballah does not materialize in the immediate future, we should try find a way to use our ongoing cooperative engagement with Syrian officials to help them recognize their overriding interest and responsibility in preventing this unappealing scenario altogether…”
– What about the Israeli miscalculation and provocative behavior – are we concerned by this possibility?
