Lina Khatib on the new, seething, dangerous masses of Hizbullah
Lina Khatib’s piece here on Hizbullah’s reaction to the STL/clinic push incorrectly argues that: “the episode marks the introduction of a new, “bottom-up” variable in Hezbollah’s political strategy that is aimed at discrediting the STL and those who cooperate with its investigations. This variable has been used to escalate the campaign with potentially serious consequences for the Lebanese government’s relationship with Hezbollah.”
Khatib then goes on to argue incorrectly that :” Of course, March 14 had also relied on the power of the multitude during the Cedar Revolution of 2005. The difference between the March 14 crowds of 2005 and Hezbollah’s today is that the latter blur the line between popular protest and directed, violent mass action.”
– The tactic is “of course” not new for Hizbullah – Khatib was perhaps not in Lebanon during the almost two years that the Hizbullah-led opposition organized a civil disobedience, downtown street protest/sit in… nor is she familiar with the last days efforts to push Israel out of south Lebanon in 2000….. etc, etc, etc…. Instead, the old Orientalist notion of the seething masses is attributed to Hizbullah crowds ONLY… they are dangerous, can/should only be dealt with through violence (as Khatib seems to suggest at the end of her short piece), and their dangerous populism ONLY discredits clean emancipatory movements like the March 14, 2005 effort which, contrary to Khatib’s claim, DID ENTAIL violence – specifically the violent reactions against syrian workers which Khatib likes to leave out or is unaware of as an avid reader of An-Nahar.
Add to this Khatib’s incorrect assertion that the Ceder Revolution was not…. “Directed.” Khatib should know better of course, given the information we now know from key M14 functionaries themselves on the different parties, figures and interests that directed the energy of March 14 towards largely selfish and ultimately plain stupid ends.
