Looking back at the “tipping point” mistakes by Israel in Lebanon

Moshe Arens’ column hits on the two points that have seemingly become the widely accepted truth and that are undergirding the march toward implementing the Dahiyeh Doctrine:

1) “As Barak’s predecessor as defense minister, my policy was to use the Israel Air Force to attack Lebanon’s infrastructure in the north in retaliation for Hezbollah attacks – so as to change the rules of engagement with Hezbollah, a decision that brought about a cessation of Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket attacks. That policy was canceled by Barak as soon as he came into office.

— when he was DM in 1999 and in 1990-1992 this was just NOT the case… Indeed the summer 1992 conflict between Hizbullah and the IDF led Nasrallah to publicly declare how the “balance of terror” had been achieved by the Katyusha policy. What’s more, that conflict was only ended by an informal Understanding which would eventually be enshrined in the famouds April 1996 Understanding (an important possible model for an escape from the next war, perhaps). Arens tough policy, in fact, was a part and parcel of the overall failure of Israeli policy vis a vis Hizbullah in the critical years 1992-2000….exactly Nasrallah’s tenure as Sec Gen.
2) “Moreover, when less than five months after the Israel Defense Forces’ unilateral withdrawal Hezbollah ambushed an army patrol on the Israeli side, killing three soldiers and taking their bodies into Lebanon, the harsh Israeli response that had been promised by Barak never took place. …This fundamental change in the strategic balance in the area, which has long-term consequences, was permitted to develop under the mistaken impression that the withdrawal had brought peace to northern Israel.”

–If there is a next conflict, these arguments will be front and center – Avi’s “34 Days” book likewise puts them at the head. If only Barak had hit back hard in October 2000 and if only Israel had (rightwing) not withdrawn from Lebanon. The Israeli left, of course, does acknowledge the idea that a withdrawal without an agreement is doomed – the center seemed to have been fine without one, while the right would rather have smashed things up more.